The relevance of accounting data to providers of capital has been strongly debated. In this paper we provide compelling evidence that accounting metrics are important to providers of debt capital over and above that contained in financial markets. Models of firm distress are mostly either purely accounting-based (e.g. Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980) or purely market-based (e.g. Merton, 1974). We examine the information content of accounting-based and market-based metrics in pricing firm distress using a sample of Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads. Credit Default Swaps are derivatives that offer protection from the event a given firm defaults on its obligations. CDS spreads provide a clean measure of default risk as they are the compensation that market participants require for bearing that risk. Using a sample of 2,860 quarterly CDS spreads available over the period [2001][2002][2003][2004][2005] we find that a model of distress which is entirely composed of accounting-based metrics performs comparably, if not better, than market-based structural models of default. Furthermore, we find that both sources of information (accounting-and market-based) are complementary in pricing distress. These results support the notion that accounting metrics have direct value-or valuation-relevance to debtholders and holders of credit derivatives.
1 Introduction
Recent studies have put in question the value-relevance of accounting information to providers of capital. Although the brunt of the assault has focused mostly on the relevance to providers of equity capital with a vast body of literature finding temporal declines in the power of accounting data to explain equity prices (e.g. Lev and Zarawin, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Brown, Lo, and Lys, 1999) , relevance to the credit markets has not remained unscathed. In particular, the class of models using accounting variables in the modeling of default (notably, Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980) have been challenged by two new classes of models, so-called structural and reduced-form, that rely exclusively on market data. On one hand, structural models (Merton, 1974) use option pricing methods to compute a probability of default from the level and volatility of market value of assets. On the other hand, reduced-form models (Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995; Duffie and Singleton, 1999) explicitly define debt value as a function of the default intensity allowing the latter to be extracted from calibration using bond prices. Market-based approaches to pricing distress have been embraced by academics and the public at large. Indeed, many purists believe that these approaches yield a highly valid probability of default statistic (e.g. Crosbie, 1999) , and recently Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004) find that structural models of default are better at forecasting distress than either of Alman's Z-or Ohlson's O-score using a large sample of bankruptcies. Furthermore, default probabilities of public companies using structural models of credit risk are now widely popular among investors since their commercial introduction by firms such as KMV and CreditMetrics in the 1990's. Likewise, default probabilities calculated using the reduced-form approach have been growing rapidly in popularity since the early 2000's (offered commercially as well, for example, by firms such as Kamakura, Inc.).
Despite the popularity of market-based default metrics, anecdotal evidence suggests that accounting information has a potentially important role to play in predicting distress. For example, the case of Enron is indicative of the possible pitfalls of relying exclusively on market information. In their promotional material, KMV point out that when Enron's stock price began to fall, the KMV probability of default immediately increased whereas agency ratings took several days to downgrade the company's debt. However, when Enron's stock price was artificially high the KMV probability of default was actually 3 lower than that assigned by traditional agency ratings. This observation led Bharath and Shumway (2005) to state: "If markets are not perfectly efficient, then conditioning on information not captured by the KMV probability of default probably makes sense." Moreover, regardless of the quality of marketbased information, many companies are privately held and thus by necessity accounting information must be used to estimate the probability of default on their (sometimes public) debt. Estimating the relevance of accounting information in the pricing of default risk is therefore an important exercise in its own right.
We examine how accounting-based and market-based variables compare in pricing the risks of default by examining a sample of 2,860 firm-quarters of Credit Default Swap spreads (CDS).
2 In short, a CDS is a relatively new contract where the buyer pays the seller a periodic premium in return for compensation in the event that a reference firm defaults. The periodic payment or spread, taken as a percentage of the notional value of the CDS contract, is a metric of the credit risk of the reference firm. The growth of the credit derivatives market since the turn of the century has been astounding: various estimates put the size of this market at over $15 trillion.
3 The credit derivatives instrument with the greatest volume by far is the CDS; it is very liquid and the quantity and quality of data now available supports extensive empirical work.
Using Credit Default Swaps to test the relevance of distress models provides an alternate approach to using samples of observed bankruptcies (e.g. Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Altman, 2000; Sobehart, Stein, Mikityanskaya, and Li, 2000; Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt, 2004; Duffie, Saita and Wang, 2005; Chava and Jarrow, 2004) , credit ratings (e.g. Ang and Patel, 1975; Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979; Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay, 1998) , or bond spreads (e.g. Wu and Zhang, 2004; Huang and Kong, 2005; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin, 2001; Longstaff and Rajan, 2006) . First, CDS spreads offer cross-sectional and time-series credit quality information. This contrasts with studying samples of bankruptcies where a company is assumed to be healthy until default occurs. Second, CDS spreads reflect market perceptions of default as opposed to those of a rating agency. Third, spreads capture both the default and recovery risk aspects of firm distress. And fourth, CDS spreads are less susceptible to liquidity and tax effects than corporate bond spreads 4 (see Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) for a look at factors other than default risk that determine bond spreads).
We find that accounting-based variables are able to explain roughly two-thirds of Credit Default Swap spreads (our model 1) and have comparable, if not slightly better, explanatory power than market-based variables (our model 2). Furthermore, a hybrid model using accounting-based variables in conjunction with market-based variables (model 3) is able to explain three-quarters of the variation in CDS spreads. Since the relative ranking of credit derivative spreads is an important activity for a variety of market participants including corporate bond fund managers (especially for high-yield portfolios), rating agencies, credit market data vendors, hedge funds, and regulators, we explore how our three models fare in that task. We test the performance of all three models in ranking spreads by examining their cumulative accuracy profiles (CAP curves) and their corresponding accuracy ratios. We find that our accounting-based model performs comparably to the market-based one and that the comprehensive model performs substantially better based on accuracy ratios.
These results present evidence that (i) accounting information is relevant in bankruptcy prediction even without the inclusion of market based information; (ii) that accounting-and market-based variables possess complementary information in the prediction of default; and (iii) that accounting information is value-relevant for users of credit derivatives. Moreover, if one is to believe that distress information is important to equity markets (see Dichev, 1998; Vassalou and Xing, 2004 , for differing viewpoints) our results, albeit indirectly, also support the value-relevance of accounting information for equity prices.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide a description of credit default swaps and motivate our empirical specifications. In section 3, we present the data and methodology. Section 4 reports the results, and section 5 concludes.
Credit Default Swaps
Credit Default Swaps are contingent claims with payoffs that are linked to the credit risk of a given entity. The entity can be a public or private firm, the subsidiary of either type of firm, a sovereign government or governmental agency. The buyer of the CDS receives protection from default risk in exchange for periodic payments (usually quarterly but sometimes semi-annually) until the expiration of the contract or until a predefined credit event occurs which, for our data, is default by the given entity. In the event of default, the buyer of the CDS spread receives a payoff equal to the difference between the face value and the market value of the underlying debt minus the CDS premium which has accrued between the default date and the last periodic payment date. In practice, buying a CDS contract is tantamount to buying insurance against default where the quarterly premium payments are determined from the CDS spreads. The CDS spreads are the annualized premium rate (using an actual-360 day convention) quoted as a fraction of the notional value of the underlying debt. In case of default, there are two settlement procedures: physical settlement which is the most widely used, and cash settlement. In a physical settlement, the buyer of protection delivers the notional value of deliverable obligations of the reference entity to the protection seller in return for the notional amount paid in cash. The acceptable set of deliverable obligations include restrictions based on maturity and need to be pari passu, meaning they have the same priority. In a cash settlement, the seller pays the buyer the face value of debt minus the recovery rate of the reference asset (this is also known as the loss given default or LGD). The recovery rate is calculated by either referencing dealer quotes or by observing market prices over some period after the default occurred.
An example will illustrate how CDS securities function. Suppose that the buyer of protection purchases a 5-year CDS security with a spread of 100 basis points and that the notional value of the underlying debt on which protection is purchased is $10 million. The buyer of the CDS will make quarterly payments of 0.01 times $10 million divided by 4 (since the CDS is quoted in annualized rates), which equals $25,000. Let us further suppose that shortly after the CDS is purchased, the reference entity defaults. If the reference entity has a recovery price of 40% the settlement is as follows: the seller compensates the buyer for the loss on the face value which is $6 million and the buyer pays the accrued premium from the last premium payment date to the date of default. For example, if default occurs 2 months after the last premium was paid the accrued premium would be $25,000 times two-thirds or approximately $16,667.
CDS securities have resulted in a number of innovations in the credit markets by making it easy to trade the credit risk of debt. This has been very popular among hedge funds wishing to hedge current credit risk exposures or wishing to take a bearish credit view. An advantage of the CDS is that it is unfunded, meaning investors do not make an upfront payment enabling them to leverage positions. Of particular interest to hedge funds is the possibility of long-short CDS trading strategies.
In order to motivate our empirical specification, it is useful to examine briefly a generic model for the pricing of CDS. If the rate of default arrival of an issuer 6 depends on a (usually stochastic) intensity process λ t , then the survival probability for the issuer from time zero to time τ is given by s τ = exp (− τ 0 λ t dt). In a fairly priced CDS contract, the expected present value of premium payments by the buyer to the seller will equal the expected present value of default loss payments from the seller to the buyer (under the risk-neutral probability measure).
4 The expected present value of payments by the seller of the CDS to the buyer will be, for a notional value of $1, given various default times τ :
where r t is the instantaneous interest rate at time t, and φ τ is the recovery rate at default time τ . The expectation E[.] is taken over all interest rate, intensity and recovery paths, and all default times. The exposition here is presented in continuous time, and may just as easily be undertaken using a discrete time analog, as is done later to facilitate estimation. The expression above has terms for discounting, as well as the conditional probability of default, given no prior failure, i.e. s τ λ τ , and the loss on default, (1 − φ τ ).
The expected present value of premium payments at rate CS (credit spread) per annum from the buyer to the seller are as follows:
Since the payments in expected present value terms between buyer and seller should be equal for the CDS to be fairly priced, equating (1) and (2) and re-arranging, results in the formula for the CDS spread
It is clear that the spread CS must depend on the factors that determine interest rates (r t ), default intensities (λ t ) and recovery rates (φ t ), comprising both firm variables as well as economy-wide factors. Firm-level variables can be either market-based (market prices of debt and/or equity) and/or accountingbased whereas economy-wide variables can be obtained from equity and interest rate markets. For details on the valuation of CDS contracts, see the article by .
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We now heuristically motivate how the structure of the function for CDS spreads leads to an empirical specification in the logarithm of spreads when the default intensity is of exponential affine form. Assume the following functional form for the default intensity (suppressing the time subscript on these forward intensities):
where B = [β 0 , . . . , β k ] is a vector of coefficients in the non-linear specification above, and X = [1, X 1 , . . . , X k ] is a vector of explanatory variables, which may include both market variables and firm financials. (Both vectors are dimension (k + 1), where k depends on the specifics of the model). Given that the default intensity lies in the range [0, ∞), this specification maintains the required bounds as well. We substitute this specification into a discrete form of equation (3), presented below, and estimate this non-linear model for all three of the models described earlier, the accounting-based, market-based, and comprehensive one.
We assume that the discrete periods in the model are based on a fixed time interval h, and that defaults and premium payments occur at the end of the period. Given the CDS maturity, the number of periods n is determined. The periods are indexed by j = 1, 2, . . . n. The discrete-time equivalent of equation (3) is as follows:
where z j is the zero-coupon discount rate for period j. Of course, λ j is the default intensity in period j. Noting that λ is a function of B and X from equation (4), we may undertake a least-squares fit of the CDS spread c as follows, across all observations:
where CS it is the actual observed value of the CDS spread and CS it is the fitted value for firm i at time t. Thus, B * is the best fit value of the parameters. In the special case where λ j = λ, i.e. constant conditional on the given state vector X, and the recovery rate is constant, i.e. φ j = φ, we obtain a simplified expression of equation (5), i.e.
CS[λ]
Taking logarithms, we obtain an approximate linear estimation equation:
where we have exploited the fact that λ = exp[B X]. The expression highlights the fact that it is natural to regress the natural logarithm of CDS spreads on explanatory variables. Indeed, as may be noticed in the work of Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko and Huang (2002) , regressions in the logarithm of spreads do fit better than in levels directly.
This simplified expression intentionally downplays the role of the dynamics of spread processes (see Pan and Singleton (2005) for a model of spread dynamics with sovereign CDS) since the primary goal in this paper is to compare the cross-sectional performance of accounting and market-based variables in explaining those spreads. Moreover, is shows that only simple estimation techniques such as Ordinary Least-Squares are necessary to model the logarithm of CDS spreads as opposed to the more sophisticated duration models necessary in estimating time to bankruptcy.
Data

Sample collection and description
Our data collection was initiated by obtaining a list of all the CDS securities with spreads available on Bloomberg. Bloomberg lists 10,503 CDS securities covering 1,563 unique debtor entities. From this list we eliminated all CDS securities where the notional value is not dollar denominated reducing the sample to 4,168 CDS securities covering 960 unique debtor entities. On this sample, we collected the CDS constant-maturity spreads at the end of each quarter over the period 2001-2005 from Bloomberg. Cossin and Lu (2005) argue that this CDS quote represents the market price for the credit risks of the borrower and is thus adequate for our purposes. We are able to obtain spread information on 790 CDS securities on 340 unique debtor entities. The sample is then merged with the COMPUSTAT Quarterly Industrial database and the CRSP daily stock file. This last procedure eliminates from the sample all non-publicly traded entities and non-US firms. Eventually, to determine our final sample, we further require that each firm possess at least 50 trading days of stock price returns prior to the end of each quarter and that data on total assets be available. Following standard practice, we exclude financial firms from the sample identified using the Fama and French (1997) 17 industry classification. Our final sample comprises 2,860 quarterly CDS spreads on 506 CDS securities representing 230 unique firms. Table 1 presents the time profile of the sample by CDS maturity. We observe from Table 1 that 5-year CDS contracts are the most common maturity traded, representing 73% of our entire sample, followed by 1-and 3-year CDS contracts, each representing around 13% of all observations. Additionally, Table 1 shows that we are unable to obtain any CDS spread quotes before the 3rd quarter of 2001 even though our search starts at the beginning of 2001; thereafter the sample size increases steadily over time. Table 2 presents the industry profile of sample firms. We assign a company to one of 16 industries (financials are excluded from our analysis) determined by Fama and French (1997) , and located on Kenneth French's website, by using the CRSP primary SIC code (COMPUSTAT SIC codes often differ from those in CRSP). For the purpose of We now turn our attention to the CDS spreads themselves. In Table 3 we present the mean and medians of CDS spread values by maturity and year. The 2-year maturity spreads are not presented in the interest of space since there are only 2 values for that category. The obvious relationship that emerges from Table 3 is that for a given year the CDS spreads with longer maturities have monotonically higher values (we dismiss the sole 10-year CDS spread in 2005 as not meaningful). Furthermore, CDS spreads on all maturities have decreased over the period for our sample suggesting an overall improvement in credit quality in the market.
In Table 4 we report the mean and median CDS spreads by industry. Overall, we find that there is considerable time variation in CDS spreads within a given industry group. The spreads in the Utilities industry for instance drop considerably from a median of 157 in 2002 to roughly 47 in 2004. In the cross-section, however, there appears to be an industry effect in which the Automobile industry most notably stands out as having consistently higher and more stable CDS spreads.
In Table 5 we report spreads by rating. Given the sample period, the spreads have declined from 2002 to 2005, as the general quality of issuers in the credit markets improved. Spreads also increase with worsening credit rating, except for the fact that AAA spreads are higher than those on AA rated firms. This aberration is likely to be explained by the fact that there are few AAA references in the sample and these are likely be the weaker AAA rated bonds given that the CDS market is most active on companies where credit risks exist in the first place. Furthermore, in bond spreads, we notice a considerable overlap in spread ranges for adjoining rating categories and as has been welldocumented in prior studies (e.g. Ericsson, Reneby and Wang, 2004) , there is a dramatic increase in spreads when moving from investment grade firms to those in non-investment grade.
Variable Construction
Accounting-Based Variables
We construct our accounting-based variables following the Moody's Private Debt Manual published on the Moody's-KMV website. We use 10 variables to proxy for 1-firm size, 2-profitability, 3-financial liquidity, 4-trading account activity, 5-sales growth and 6-capital structure. We choose to use the Moody's accounting ratios rather than the Z-score Altman (1968) or O-score (Ohlson, 1980) measures of distress for several reasons. First, using the O-score or the Zscore (e.g. Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt, 2004) will put accounting information at an unfair disadvantage in predicting default due to their highly restrictive functional specifications. A score in essence summarizes information and will necessarily possess less explanatory power than the inclusion of its components in a multivariate regression. Secondly, using the Moody's variables allows us to consider potentially important variables not included in either score such as interest coverage. We list the variables and their construction below:
(1) As a measure of firm size we use the value of total assets (COMPUSTATQuarterly item 44) divided by the Consumer Price Index on all-urban consumers, all items (Series CUUR0000SA0) with a base of 100 in the period 1982-1984. (2) We compute three ratios that gauge profitability: return on assets (ROA), net income growth, and interest coverage. ROA is constructed as net income (item 69) divided by total assets. Net income growth is calculated as net income minus the previous quarter's net income divided by total assets. Interest coverage is calculated as pretax income (item 23) plus interest expense (item 22) divided by interest expense. (3) To assess the firm's financial liquidity we use the quick ratio and the cash to asset ratio. The quick ratio is constructed as current liabilities (item 40) minus inventories (item 38) over current assets (item 49) and the cash-to-asset ratio is cash and equivalents (item 36) over total assets. (4) We measure the firm's trading account activity by using the ratio of inventories to cost of goods sold (item 30). (5) The quarterly sales growth is calculated as sales (item 2) divided by the previous quarter sales minus one. (6) Finally, to proxy for differences in the capital structure of the firm, we calculate the ratio of total liabilities (item 54) to total assets and the ratio of retained earnings (item 58) to total assets.
In some instances of flow items, COMPUSTAT reports a missing value in the first and third quarter of the year when the data reported in the second and fourth quarters are semi-annual numbers. When this event occurs, we set the first and second quarter data to one-half the semi-annual reported value in the second quarter. We proceed similarly in the third and fourth quarter using the fourth quarter semi-annual numbers.
In order to account for seasonal effects, we take the trailing four-quarter average of ROA, sales growth, interest coverage, and inventories over cost of goods sold before including these variables in the model. The relationship between CDS spreads and interest coverage is likely to be monotonically increasing; yet when the interest coverage is very large, the effect of small changes in interest coverage should be negligible. Moreover, when the interest coverage is negative, the ratio is not meaningful since the relative magnitude of pretax income to interest expense is blurred. For these reasons, we follow Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) by transforming the interest coverage ratio in two ways. First, before taking the trailing four quarter average, we set any quarterly interest coverage ratio to zero if they are negative. Second, any trailing 4 quarter average interest coverage ratio that exceeds 100 is censored on the assumption that further increases in value convey no additional information. We also follow Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) in changing the specification of the model to allow the data to determine the shape of the nonlinearity. Specifically, let IC it be the interest coverage for firm i in quarter t, we then include the interest coverage ratio in the regression model as:
where c jit is defined in the following table as:
This specification allows the regression model to determine different coefficient parameters on each increment of the interest coverage ratio.
Market-based variables
Two common market-based approaches to estimating the probability of default are the Merton (1974) distance-to-default (DTD) measure and the default intensity obtained from the calibration of reduced form models. We focus on the former distance-to-default for several reasons. First, as Arora, Bohn and Zhu (2005) find reduced form models are difficult to calibrate because of the differing quality of bond pricing information on the reference entities. Secondly, the distance-to-default remains the mostly widely used market-based credit risk metric. Additionally, the distance-to-default is of particular interest since Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004) find that it outperforms accounting information in the prediction of default. We now turn to constructing our market-based measure of default. We estimate the market value of debt using the Merton (1974) bond pricing model where the total value of the firm is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion,
where V is the total value of the firm, µ is the expected continuously compounded return on V , σ v is the volatility of firm returns and dW is a standard Weiner process. The firm is assumed to have one discount bond maturity in T periods. Under these assumptions the equity of the firm E is a call option on the underlying value of the firm with an exercise price equal to the face value of debt F and a time to maturity of T . The value of equity is then modeled using the Black-Scholes-Merton formula,
13 where N (.) is the cumulative normal distribution function with d 1 and d 2 given by:
Under the Merton (1974) assumptions the value of equity is a function of the value and time so it follows directly from Ito's lemma that:
The Merton model uses equations (10) and (12) as a system of two equations and two unknowns to solve for V and σ v where σ e , µ, E, F , and r can all be obtained exogenously. T is assumed to be one year following standard practice. We estimate these inputs in the following manner: σ e is the annualized standard deviation of returns and is estimated from the prior 100 trading days of stock price returns from CRSP. µ is estimated as the annualized mean equity returns on the prior 100 trading days. Similar to Bharath and Shumway (2005) , we require that at least 50 trading days be available in the computations. E the market value of equity is computed from COMPUSTAT as the number of shares outstanding times the end of quarter closing stock price. Following Vassalou and Xing (2004), we take the face value of debt F to be debt in current liabilities (item 45) plus one-half of long-term debt (item 51). The risk-free rate r is obtained using the 3-month treasury constant maturity rate from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint-Louis. The 1-year treasury constant maturity rate is often used instead to match with the maturity of the bond. We follow Duffie, Saita and Wang (2005) in choosing the 3-month rate. Using these inputs, we numerically solve the system of simultaneous equations in the Merton model to obtain the firm value V and the volatility of the firm and calculate the distance to default as:
Distance-to-default, in short, is a volatility adjusted measure of leverage.
Macroeconomic Variables
We include in our models additional variables to proxy for the macroeconomic environment. We use the risk-free rate r estimated as the 3-month treasury constant maturity rate. This rate is the same across all firms in the same period and therefore also acts as the time dummy variable accounting for the 14 time clustering in the data. We also include the prior year return on the S&P 500, and the prior year return on the Fama and French (1997) industry group that the firm belongs to. Since periods of low interest rates are usually related to economic downturns, we expect a negative relation between the risk free rate and CDS spreads. Duffee (1998) , Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) and Bharath and Shumway (2005) find a negative relationship between changes in interest rates and changes in default risk. We also expect a negative coefficient on the S&P 500 and industry returns, as low market returns are associated with higher probabilities of default. Duffie, Saita and Wang (2005) find that the trailing 1-year S&P 500 returns are positively correlated to default events and explain that this relationship might be due to the trailing nature of returns and business cycles. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), on the other hand, use the monthly S&P 500 index returns as a measure of business climate and find a negative relationship with default risk.
To some extent the first two variables can be viewed as a proxy for quarterly period effects and the industry returns can be viewed as time-varying industry effects. Table 7 presents descriptive statistics on our accounting-based and marketbased determinants of CDS spreads for the sample firms. In this table, every given firm is represented as many times as CDS spreads are available on that company. Notably, the average firm value V is roughly $35 billion with a median of approximately $14.5 billion, suggesting that a few companies have very large firm values, thereby skewing the distribution. The volatility of equity appears to be well distributed around a mean of 28%. Our sample firms tend to be smaller though less volatile than the 71 firms with available CDS quotes studied in Ericsson, Reneby and Wang (2004) who report an average firm size of $84 billion and a mean volatility of equity of 46%. Our measure of the distance to default appears well distributed around 10. This value is much higher than the ones reported in Ericsson, Reneby and Wang (2004) suggesting that our sample firms are further from default; this result might be accounted for in part by the fact that they eliminated all firms with AAA rated debt.
Results
Univariate Results
We start our analysis by examining the univariate relationship of CDS spreads with our firm-level accounting variables. Table 8 reports the mean and median CDS spreads for quartiles of the sample sorted on the basis of the firm-level accounting variable of interest. Quartile 1 stands for the lowest values of the variable. We find strong results that suggest accounting-based variables play an important role in explaining CDS spread values. Notably, we find a strong monotonic relationship in both the mean and median spreads of several variables in a direction which is consistent with theory. The mean and median spreads drop considerably as ROA, and the interest coverage ratio increase. As expected, the capital structure of the firm plays an important role in determining spreads with higher levels of book leverage associated with higher mean and median spreads and higher levels of retained earnings associated with both lower mean and median spreads. Interestingly, our measure of trading-account activity, the inventory over cost of goods sold appears to be strongly monotonic in the unexpected direction that higher levels in the ratio are associated with lower spreads. One would expect higher inventory levels to be associated with a business downturn and thus to higher credit risks. It is possible however that the market perceives inventory levels as valuable assets which can be liquidated in the event of default.
The quick ratio appears to produce mixed effects with median spreads monotonically decreasing with higher quick ratio levels and the mean spreads monotonically increasing with higher quick ratio levels.
In our univariate results, there does not appear to be a meaningful relationship between CDS spreads and our measures of size, income growth, sales growth, and the cash ratio. Moodys-KMV find empirical evidence suggesting that measures of sales growth have a non-monotonic relationship with the probability of default but we are not able to corroborate these findings as both the mean and median of CDS spreads are virtually the same across all quartiles. These variables, and in particular firm size, are likely to be important in a multivariate setting since most of our variables are normalized using firm size.
Multivariate Results
We next examine (i) an accounting-based multivariate model of the determinants of credit spreads and we compare its explanatory power to (ii) a model which uses market information and (iii) a comprehensive model which includes both accounting-and market-based information.
Accounting-Based Model (Model 1)
For each firm i and quarter t we estimate the following least-squares regression where log(CS it ) is the natural log of the CDS spread at the end of quarter t for firm i. Table 6 provides a description of the short-hand variable names as well as their predicted signs. Table 9 , column 1, presents our findings on this regression model. As a result of missing firm-level data, the number of observations in our model drops to 2,242 firm-quarters. We find a negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level) relationship between the book value of size and CDS spreads meaning that larger firms present less risk of credit default. Corroborating our univariate results, we find a strong negative relationship between accounting performance as measured by ROA and CDS spreads. Furthermore, as we hypothesized earlier the relationship between interest coverage and spreads is overall negative and non-linear. When the interest coverage is between 0 and 5 the parameter coefficient is −0.08 and is significant at more than the 1% level of statistical significance. This coefficient decreases to −0.02 when the interest coverage is between 5 and 10 and the level of significance decreases but is still below 5% level of statistical significance. Between 10 and 20 the interest coverage ratio is not significant, whereas beyond 20 the coefficient is negative but very close to zero and significant at the 5% level. The quick ratio which appeared to produce mixed results in the univariate setting is positively related to spreads in the multivariate regression with a coefficient of 0.07, which is significant at the 5% level. The cash-to-asset ratio and sales growth measure, as in our univariate results, produce no significant association with the CDS spreads.
In the regression we control for macroeconomic factors as we discussed earlier by including the risk-free rate, the prior year S&P 500 returns, and the return on the industry. We find a negative relationship between all three variables and the CDS spreads suggesting that the security is very sensitive to the current macroeconomic environment and, in particular, to stock market conditions. This is consistent with the findings of Duffie, Saita and Wang (2005) . We include in the regression a dummy for whether the underlying debt is considered to be investment grade or not. We define investment grade as a debt issued by a firm with a BBB rating or higher in which case the attribute variable takes on a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. Not surprisingly, we find that investment grade firms have significantly lower spreads. Finally, we control in our model for characteristics of the CDS contract including maturity and whether the underlying debt is senior.
Since our goal is to assess the comparative explanatory power of marketbased and accounting-based models, our main focus will remain on the R 2 in the regressions. The explanatory power of our accounting-based model is high as it is able to explain 65% of the variation in our sample of CDS spreads. Overall, the explanatory power of this model, which does not include a single firm-level market variable, compares very favorably to market-based models reported in other studies (e.g. Berndt, Douglas, Duffie, Ferguson, and Schranz (2003) ). Differences in our accounting-based model with those found in other studies could very easily be due to differences in the sample itself rather than the model specification. For instance, as mentioned earlier our sample includes a larger number of unique firms in many more different industries than prior studies. Our panel is cross-sectionally diverse, which suits the goals of this study, rather than long in the time-series which is better for studies that focus on dynamics. We now estimate a model based on market variables (firm-level and general market) for the benefit of comparison.
Market-Based Model (Model 2)
There is accumulating evidence that equity market information may be used to explain credit spreads, as in papers by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Das, Freed, Geng and Kapadia (2001) , Duffie, Saita and Wang (2005 ), Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2005 ), and Bystrom (2005 . Therefore, our marketbased model contains both firm and market-wide equity variables.
For each firm i and quarter t we estimate the following least-squares regression where log(CS it ) is the natural log of the CDS spread at the end of quarter t for firm i.
In Table 9 , column 2, we present the results of the preceding regression model where market variables are used to determine CDS spreads. Our main variable of interest in this model is the distance to default (DTD) which is often regarded as a sufficient statistic to determine the probability of default. We also include in the model the same variables that proxy for business climate as were used previously as well an investment grade dummy. We control for the CDS contract characteristics in the same manner as model 1. Additionally, we include the last 100 trading-days average of the equity returns for firm i at quarter t, which we denote in the model as ret it . This measure is used by Duffie, Saita and Wang (2005) in combination with distance to default (DTD) to measure firm default intensity. Rather than use DTD, a volatility adjusted measure of leverage, Carr and Wu (2005) employ option volatility and find this simpler variable also provides high explanatory power for the few firms they examine in their paper; similar ideas permeate the paper by Cossin and Lu (2005) . Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo-Helfenberger (2004) show that a model with leverage and volatility variables can explain over 60% of the levels of CDS spreads. Chen, Cheng and Wu (2005) employ a similar market-based regression as the one above in a four-factor model and find that two interest rate factors, and a credit and liquidity factor are all significant in explaining CDS spreads.
Before performing the regression we ensure that the market model is estimated on the same observations as the accounting based model for the sake of comparison. As expected, we find that the distance to default is strongly negatively related to CDS spreads at more than the 1% level of significance. We also find that the trailing 100-day return is highly significant. Overall, we find that the explanatory power of the market-based model is comparable to our accounting-based model with an R 2 of 64% versus 65% in the latter model. From this we may infer that firm financials are important variables to use in explaining spreads cross-sectionally, since they do as well, if not better than market-based measures. This may also indicate that market trading results in values consistent with those reported in the financial statements for the purposes of credit information. These results beg the question as to whether model improvements are possible if market-based measures are used in combination with accounting measures.
Comprehensive Model (Model 3)
We address the question as to whether market-based measures of default add any value if they are used in combination with accounting measures by performing the following regression model (which we call "comprehensive").
Our comprehensive model consists in estimating the following least-squares regression for each firm i and quarter t where log(CS it ) is the natural logarithm of CDS spread:
The variables that are included in the comprehensive model are simply the union of variables in model 1 and model 2. In this model, we find strong results indicating that market-based information is complementary to firm-level accounting-based data or vice-versa. Indeed, the variables which constituted the basis of the accounting-based model are still strongly significant with the same signs (except for the quick ratio whose coefficient was pushed down to zero). The previous statement applies equally to the market-based variables which retain their signs and levels of significance except for the prior 100-day firm equity returns. The explanatory power of the comprehensive model is 72% which is a strong improvement over the previous two models. Overall these results suggest two things. First, the distance to default may not be a sufficient statistic in modeling the cross-section of credit default swap spreads. Second, accounting variables possess valuable information in determining spreads which is not captured by the traditional market-based measures of default.
Robustness
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks. Our first robustness check consists in re-estimating all three models on the subset of 5-year CDS spreads (i.e. dropping other maturities). Our second check consists in using the probability of default rather than the distance to default as our primary market-based measure of default. The third consists in re-estimating our accounting-based model with only the variables that are significant at the 5% level or better. Next, we address the concern that accounting data is made available to the public subsequent to the quarter-end. Finally, we test the model out-of-sample. First, we estimate the models using only the 5-year CDS spread data. The number of observations drops to 1,624 but our results are qualitatively unchanged. The accounting-based model R 2 decreases to 62%, the market-based model R 2 decreases to 61%, whereas the comprehensive model R 2 stands at 69%. All coefficients and degrees of significance remain virtually identical.
Second, many studies use the probability of default (defined as N (−DT D)), rather than the distance to default. We re-estimate all three models with the full sample of 2,242 CDS-quarters and, overall, find weaker results for both the market based and comprehensive model which under this new specification can explain 50% and 66% of the variance in the logarithm of CDS spreads. We also re-estimate the market based model and comprehensive model with the logarithm of the probability of default and find R 2 's of 58% and 68% respectively. Therefore, the models are sensitive to non-linear scaling of distance to default; our results suggest that using distance to default directly provides better results.
Third, we re-estimate the accounting and comprehensive model with only the accounting variables that are significant at the 5% level or higher (not reported). We find that both models do not suffer as a result. The R 2 s for the accounting-model and the comprehensive model remain at 65% and 72%, respectively. This suggests that the cash-to-asset ratio, the sales growth, and income growth identified by Moody's-KMV as important variables in determining credit worthiness are superfluous in a model of CDS spreads. Interestingly, Altman's Z-score does not include these variables and Ohlson's O-score contains an income growth variable but does not include the cash-to-asset ratio and sales-growth measures.
Next, we address the concern that accounting-based data is not actually known at the end of the quarter but is reported at some subsequent time. Sengupta (2004) finds that this delay is on average around 40 days, although it has been widespread over the period for managers to offer earnings guidance prior to the official press release [Noe, Christopher and Hansen (1998) ]. This problem is not an issue in uncovering the determinants of CDS spreads per se but is relevant in assessing whether some trading strategies are implementable in real-time. To verify this we re-examine all three models using the next quarter CDS spreads as the dependent variable. The findings reported in table 10 are that the accounting-based model retains strong explanatory power with an R 2 of 62%. The market-based model fairs relatively worse at explaining the leading spreads with an R 2 of 60% and the comprehensive model is able to retain most of its explanatory power with an R 2 of 69%. These results are quite robust considering that the measurements of the independent and dependent variables are one quarter apart.
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Finally, we test the out-of-sample performance of our models. To test the outof-sample forecast of our cross-sectional models we randomly split our pooled sample of CDS spreads into an in-sample and out-of-sample of approximately equal sizes (the in-sample and out-of-sample contain 1,124 and 1,136 observations respectively). We then re-estimate all three models in-sample and use the resulting parameters to determine the out-of-sample predicted values. If the model predicts correctly out-of-sample we would expect the actual values and predicted values to be highly correlated. Furthermore if we were to regress the actual values on the predicted values we would expect the intercept to be zero and the the slope to be one. Figure 2 shows the results of those regressions for all three models. As is apparent all three models present very strong abilities to forecast out-of-sample CDS spreads. Model 1 and 2 have R 2 's of 65%-67% range respectively. The coefficients on both models is statistically no different than one and the intercepts are statistically no different than zero. An F-test of the joint hypothesis that the slope is equal to one and the intercept is zero fails to be rejected at any conventional level of significance. For model 3 the fit is much stronger with an R 2 of 71% and the joint hypothesis that the slope is one and the intercept is zero also fails to be rejected.
Rank-Order Predictability
Predicting the relative ranking of CDS spreads rather than their point estimates is of central interest to hedge fund managers and CDS traders. Relative trading strategies consist in selling a CDS whose credit quality is expected to improve relative to another company whose CDS is being bought. Therefore we investigate how the accounting-based model compares to the market-based model in terms of relative rankings of CDS spreads.
To assess the performance of our model in determining relative rankings we construct cumulative accuracy profile (CAP) curves and the associated accuracy ratio (AR) statistics. The cumulative accuracy profile consists in ranking the predicted values of log CS it (log credit spreads) and the corresponding actual values log CS it independently from highest to lowest. We then create 100 bins and assign the top 1% of all predicted values to the first bin, the top 2% to the second bin and so on and so forth until the 100 th bin is populated which, of course, would consist of the total number of observations. We then repeat this exercise for the actual values. Once our bins are populated, we compare how many predicted values in a given bin also have their actual values in that same bin. We then plot that percentage for each bin; the resulting graphic is the cumulative accuracy profile of our model. The accuracy ratio associated with a given cumulative accuracy profile is defined in the manner of Duffie, Saita and Wang (2005) as twice the area that lies between the curve and the 45 degree line. The maximum accuracy ratio is thus by construction 100% and the minimum 0%. In general, accuracy ratios above 50% are considered acceptable for the purpose of predicting default. Figure 1 presents the cumulative accuracy profile for all three models and their corresponding accuracy ratios. The accuracy ratio is 61.6% for our comprehensive model, 56.7% for our accounting-based model and 56.5% for the market-based model. These results suggest that the relative rankings of CDS spreads are more difficult to model than actual default events where Duffie, Saita and Wang (2005) find accuracy ratios of 88% based on the distance to default measure and economy-wide level data. Hamilton and Cantor (2004) find accuracy ratios of 65% based on Moody's Credit Ratings. Also, Blochwitz, Liebig, and Nyberg (2000) find accuracy ratios of 59.7% for the KMV Private Firm Model. Credit spreads may also contain other elements like liquidity and tax effects, though our use of CDS spreads is an attempt to mitigate the influence of such factors. Also, CDS spreads contain default risk premia, which are harder to rank and explain. Figure 3 presents the out-of-sample CAP curves. There appears to be little loss of power in our out-of-sample predictions. This result supports the robust cross-sectional fit of the model.
Conclusion
The relevance of accounting data to providers of capital has been strongly debated. In this paper we provide compelling evidence that accounting metrics are important to providers of debt capital. We develop two competing models to explain the cross sectional variation of credit default swaps (CDS). One that uses accounting data and another that uses equity market data. Credit Default Swaps are derivatives that offer protection from the event a given firm defaults on its obligations. CDS spreads provide a clean measure of default risk as they are the compensation that market participants require for bearing that risk. Using a large sample of 2,860 CDS spreads, we find that accounting data are better predictors of CDS spreads than the structural models that use market data. This finding is robust to different specifications and holds out-of-sample. More importantly, a model that makes use of both sources of information, accounting and market-based, explains a substantially larger proportion of CDS spreads than either source taken on its own. We recommend that rather than viewing accounting and market information as substitutes, they should be viewed as complementary to each other, at least in the prediction of default. An important consideration, is that accounting data has an advantage over 23 market data since they can be used to quantify credit risks on firms that do not have traded equity or are infrequently traded. Fig. 1 . Cumulative accuracy profile (CAP) and accuracy ratio for spreads models. The cumulative accuracy profile consists in ranking the predicted values of log CS it (log credit spreads) and the corresponding actual values log CS it independently from highest to lowest. We then create 100 bins and assign the top 1% of all predicted values to the first bin, the top 2% to the second bin and so on and so forth until the 100 th bin is populated which of course would consist of the total number of observations. We then repeat this exercise for the actual values. Once our bins are populated we compare how many predicted values in a given bin also have their actual values in that same bin. We then plot that percentage for each bin; the resulting graphic is the cumulative accuracy profile of our model. The accuracy ratio associated with a given cumulative accuracy profile is defined in the manner of Duffie, Saita and Wang (2005) as twice the area that lies between the curve and the 45 degree line. Model 3 AR=61.7% Fig. 3 . Cumulative accuracy profile (CAP) and accuracy ratio for out-of-sample spread models using the split-sample methodology. The cumulative accuracy profile consists in ranking the predicted values of log CS it (log credit spreads) and the corresponding actual values log CS it independently from highest to lowest. We then create 100 bins and assign the top 1% of all predicted values to the first bin, the top 2% to the second bin and so on and so forth until the 100 th bin is populated which of course would consist of the total number of observations. We then repeat this exercise for the actual values. Once our bins are populated we compare how many predicted values in a given bin also have their actual values in that same bin. We then plot that percentage for each bin; the resulting graphic is the cumulative accuracy profile of our model. The accuracy ratio associated with a given cumulative accuracy profile is defined in the manner of Duffie, Saita and Wang (2005) as twice the area that lies between the curve and the 45 degree line. Table 7 Descriptive Statistics. Our sample consists of 2,860 quarterly CDS spreads from 2001Q3 to 2005Q1 obtained from Bloomberg on which accounting data for the underlying bond issuer is available in the Compustat quarterly files and price information on at least 50 trading days is available on CRSP. The sample comprises 230 unique firms. Firms operating in the financial sector were excluded from the analysis. Accounting ratios are calculated following the Moody's Private Firm model. Total Assets/CPI is the deflated value of the firms total assets using the CPI obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Net Income growth is calculated as the trailing 4 quarter average of net income over assets minus the previous quarter net income over assets. Interest Coverage is calculated as the trailing 4 quarter average of pretax income plus interest expense over interest expense. The quick ratio is calculated as current assets minus inventories over current liabilities. Sales Growth is the trailing 4 quarter average of the quarterly growth in sales. The distance to default is calculated by iteratively solving the Merton model described in the text using the firms equity value during the quarter, the previous 100 trading day volatility of equity returns from CRSP, the 3-month constant maturity T-Bill obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank, and the face value of debt computed as current debt plus 1/2 of long-term debt. Table 9 OLS regressions of the log of CDS spreads to accounting measures (Model 1), market-based measures (Model 2) and both (Model 3). The sample size is kept constant across all three models and consists of 2,860 quarterly CDS spreads from 2001Q3 to 2005Q1 obtained from Bloomberg on which accounting data for the underlying bond issuer is available in the Compustat quarterly files and price information on at least 50 trading days is available on CRSP. The sample comprises 230 unique firms (excluding financial firms). Accounting ratios are calculated following the Moody's Private Firm model. Total Assets/CPI is the deflated value of the firms total assets using the CPI from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Net Income growth is the trailing 4 quarter average of net income over assets minus the previous quarter net income over assets. Interest Coverage is calculated as the trailing 4 quarter average of pretax income plus interest expense over interest expense. The quick ratio is calculated as current assets minus inventories over current liabilities. Sales Growth is the trailing 4 quarter average of the quarterly growth in sales. The distance to default is calculated by iteratively solving the Merton model using the equity value during the quarter, the previous 100 trading day volatility of equity returns from CRSP, the 3-month constant maturity T-Bill obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank, and the face value of debt computed as current debt plus 1/2 of long-term debt. Mean and volatility of equity returns are also included separately in the regression. T-statistics are reported below the coefficients with ***,**,* representing 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. OLS regressions of the leading log of CDS spreads (following quarter) to accounting measures (Model 1), market-based measures (Model 2) and both (Model 3). The sample size is kept constant across all three models and consists of 2,860 quarterly CDS spreads from 2001Q3 to 2005Q1 obtained from Bloomberg on which accounting data for the underlying bond issuer is available in the Compustat quarterly files and price information on at least 50 trading days is available on CRSP. The sample comprises 230 unique firms (excluding financial firms). Accounting ratios are calculated following the Moody's Private Firm model. Total Assets/CPI is the deflated value of the firms total assets using the CPI from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Net Income growth is the trailing 4 quarter average of net income over assets minus the previous quarter net income over assets. Interest Coverage is calculated as the trailing 4 quarter average of pretax income plus interest expense over interest expense. The quick ratio is calculated as current assets minus inventories over current liabilities. Sales Growth is the trailing 4 quarter average of the quarterly growth in sales. The distance to default is calculated by iteratively solving the Merton model using the equity value during the quarter, the previous 100 trading day volatility of equity returns from CRSP, the 3-month constant maturity T-Bill obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank, and the face value of debt computed as current debt plus 1/2 of long-term debt. Mean and volatility of equity returns are also included separately in the regression. T-statistics are reported below the coefficients with ***,**,* representing 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
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